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Abstract

Fannie Mae has been widely criticized for its role in the recent
financial crisis, yet no detailed analysis of the systematic patterns
of the mortgage defaults that occurred has been published. To
address this knowledge gap, we perform data mining on the
Fannie Mae mortgage portfolio of the fourth quarter of 2007,
which includes 340,537 mortgages with a total principal value
of $69.8 billion. This portfolio had the highest delinquency rate
in the agency’s history: 19.4% versus the historical average of
1.7%. We find that although a number of information variables
that were available at the time of mortgage acquisition are
correlated with the subsequent delinquencies, building an
accurate model proves challenging. Identification of the majority
of delinquencies in the historical data comes at a cost of low
precision.

The financial crisis of 2007–2009 is considered the worst since the Great
Depression of the 1930s (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). The crisis
was precipitated by the rapid decline in housing prices in the United States. The
decline triggered a complex web of events leading to the insolvency of a number
of financial institutions and consequent freezing in the credit markets, which had
broad effects across the economy (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011).
The U.S. GDP contracted 0.3% in 2008 and another 3.1% in 2009 (Young, 2013).
The financial crisis affected many people. Nearly $11 trillion in household wealth
vanished, and four million families lost their homes to foreclosure (Young, 2013).
Unemployment reached 10% in the fall of 2009 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015)
and the effects of the crisis persist eight years later (Andriotis, 2015).
The rapid decline in housing prices starting in 2007 has been attributed to the
period of irrational exuberance in the preceding years that was fueled by easy
credit available for home financing (Shiller, 2015). Approximately 70% of real
estate purchases in the U.S. are financed (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
2011), meaning that the buyers borrow at least a part of the home value to facilitate
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the purchase. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, were established in 1938 and 1970 respectively, to make it easier for
individual homebuyers to afford a home (Peterson, 2008). The GSEs buy
mortgages from banks and financial intermediaries, offering liquidity in the
mortgage markets and making it easier for individual homebuyers to acquire
financing.
The GSEs back nearly 60% of all individual real estate mortgages in the U.S.
(Kan and Robotti, 2007). The agencies securitize mortgages for sale to investors
and they also hold a substantial portfolio of mortgages on their balance sheets.
Fannie Mae is the larger of the two agencies. In 2007, the Fannie Mae mortgage
portfolio was valued at $403 billion, while the Freddie Mac portfolio was valued
at $75 billion (Fannie Mae, 2008; Freddie Mac, 2008). Both agencies were highly
leveraged and the decline in the real estate values associated with the financial
crisis triggered a wave of mortgage defaults that effectively bankrupted both
agencies, leading the Federal Housing Finance Agency to place both in
conservatorship in 2008 (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011).
The GSEs have been frequently criticized for loose underwriting standards in the
period preceding the crisis (Wallison and Calomiris, 2009). However, to the best
of our knowledge, no systematic analysis of the agencies’ mortgage portfolios has
been published to substantiate the criticism, and, even more importantly, to extract
lessons for the future. We take the first steps in this task here. We review the
Fannie Mae prime 30-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) portfolio delinquencies in
the 2000–2014 period and we identify the fourth quarter of 2007 as the mortgage
portfolio with the highest rate of severe delinquencies. We perform extensive data
mining on this portfolio to understand the extent to which data mining techniques
can be used to build predictive models based on the identification of systematic
patterns and salient predictors. The answers to these questions shed light on the
systematic relations between the information variables that were available prior to
mortgage origination and mortgage delinquencies during the financial crisis to
inform practice and policy decisions. In the sections that follow, we provide an
overview of the studies on mortgage delinquencies associated with the recent
financial crisis, as well as a summary of prior work on applying data mining
techniques to predict credit defaults. We describe the dataset in our study and
present the data mining results. We conclude with a discussion of our findings
and their implications for practice and policy.

u

Background

Government estimates for the fourth quarter of 2015 show that there is
approximately $13.795 trillion in outstanding mortgage obligations in the U.S.
(Federal Reserve, 2016). Mortgage lending is an important area of practice and
the recent financial crisis stimulated new research aimed at understanding the
causes of the mortgage defaults (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011), as well as
the evaluation of the effectiveness of the government programs aimed at alleviating
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borrower hardship brought about by the financial crisis (Schmeiser and Gross,
2016). The research on mortgage defaults is commonly grounded in the competing
hazards model developed by Deng (1997) and Clapp, Deng, and An (2006) who
apply econometric models to investigate the individual and structural factors that
affect mortgage default decisions. Much of the published research in this stream
relies on the information that was available after the mortgages had been issued
(ex post stage). The research done by Smith (2011) exemplifies the use of the ex
post data for analysis. Using loan-level and credit data to evaluate mortgage
performance after origination, the author shows that declining credit scores are
associated with the higher probability of a default, whereas increasing credit scores
are associated with refinancing.
There has been much less recent work examining the effects of the salient factors
that are available prior to mortgage origination (ex ante stage). This is likely due
to the transition of many financial institutions to automated underwriting systems
that in effect codified existing practices (Lacour-Little, Park, and Green, 2012).
For example, the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 80% is required by GSEs
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013), and it has become a widely
accepted industry standard for qualified mortgages. Borrowers are generally
required to obtain mortgage insurance if they borrow more than 80% of the value
of a home, thus significantly raising the cost of obtaining a non-qualified
mortgage. Similarly, the industry has established norms for the qualified mortgage
borrower credit score, LTV, and debt-to-income (DTI) as other critical factors
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2014). To the best of our knowledge,
there has not been a published systematic examination of the critical values in
these factors that may influence mortgage defaults, particularly in the environment
of falling real estate prices and increasing unemployment. Further, there is some
disagreement on the critical role of these factors in lending decisions. For example,
Archer, Elmer, Harrison, and Ling (2002) show that LTV had little predictive value
in multifamily properties.
In this study, we examine the data that were available to Fannie Mae prior to
mortgage origination (ex ante) and we apply data mining techniques to explore
the systematic relations that were present at the mortgage origination stage that
may yield clues to mortgage risks. We also examine the effects of specific critical
values of the borrower credit score, LTV, and DTI on mortgage defaults in the
Fannie Mae portfolio.
Research on the Mortgage Defaults Associated with the
Recent Financial Crisis

The competing hazards model, developed by Deng (1997), Ciochetti, Deng, Gao,
and Yao (2002), Clapp, Deng, and An (2006), An and Qi (2012), and Jiang,
Nelson, and Vytlacil (2014), is the dominant theoretical perspective in the recent
ex post mortgage default research. In the competing hazards model, lenders face
two interdependent risks. The first risk is that the borrower will repay the mortgage
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ahead of term, thus precluding the lender from earning interest over the full term
of the mortgage. The second risk is that the borrower will default on the mortgage.
Clearly, the mortgage default risk poses a greater threat because it affects both
the unpaid principal and the future interest payments. The two risks are
interdependent, because an early mortgage prepayment eliminates the default risk
and a mortgage default markedly reduces the likelihood of an early prepayment.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, there have been investigations into the
factors that affect mortgage default decisions that revealed some unexpected
findings. Initial studies suggested that the decline in housing prices produced
negative equity (outstanding mortgage balance being higher than the value of a
home) for many borrowers. The negative equity was proposed as the motive
underlying the rising rate of defaults (Bajari, Chu, and Park, 2008; Foote, Gerardi,
and Willen, 2008). Subsequent research on the mortgage defaults in 2008 showed
that negative equity was not an immediate trigger for a mortgage default, as may
be expected from a completely rational real estate investor, but rather most
homeowners with negative equity did not default until the negative equity reached
40% of the value of the home (Campbell and Cocco, 2011). Elul et al. (2010)
further elucidated the relation between negative equity and the defaults by showing
that liquidity shocks (loss of income) play a greater role in explaining mortgage
defaults than negative equity. To add a further nuance to the complexity of the
individual decisions underlying mortgage defaults, a survey of mortgage borrowers
showed that individual numerical ability is negatively correlated with mortgage
defaults after controlling for general cognitive ability, as well as demographic and
financial variables (Gerardi, Goette, and Meier, 2010). While the studies focusing
on the ex post default decisions offer insights on the underlying causes of
mortgage defaults, the ex post data (e.g., a borrower’s employment prospects
during an economic downturn) are difficult to gauge accurately at the time of
mortgage origination and therefore, these results are difficult to translate into
underwriting decisions.
Data Mining Studies of Credit Defaults

Data mining, also often called ‘‘knowledge discovery in databases’’ (KDD) refers
to algorithmic discovery of patterns in data (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, and
Smyth, 1996). We should note that data mining is different from the commonly
employed econometric models that are concerned with parameter estimation in
the context of specified models. Data mining techniques do not specify a model
a priori, but rather focus on evaluation of how different types of data mining
models can capture patterns of covariation in the data. Published data mining
studies of mortgage defaults have been primarily done using datasets originating
from outside the U.S. using different modeling techniques (support-vector
machine, artificial neural network, decision tree, and random forest). A seminal
study that evaluated the efficacy of different modeling techniques using eight
credit scoring datasets from the United Kingdom and Benelux suggest that support
vector machines and artificial neural network algorithms could deliver the best
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results (Baesens et al., 2003). A study of mortgage defaults in Israel found that
the decision tree algorithm offered the best accuracy in predicting defaults
(Feldman and Gross, 2005), and a study of a synthetic German credit dataset
based on real-world data showed that random forest algorithm outperforms other
techniques in predicting loan defaults (Ghatasheh, 2014). In summary, data mining
studies with international credit datasets did not produce conclusive findings
regarding the best way to model credit defaults. This has been confirmed in recent
work that showed that different algorithms offer better performance across
different international credit-related datasets (Zurada, Kunene, and Guan, 2014).

u

Method
Data Source

Following the financial crisis, GSEs are required to make their mortgage
origination and mortgage performance data public. We obtained the Fannie Mae
mortgage origination and mortgage performance data covering the period between
the first quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2014 directly from the agency.
The mortgage origination dataset contains information that was available to the
agency at the time of mortgage acquisition. These data include individual borrower
characteristics (e.g., personal credit score), as well as information about the
property (number of units) and the financial details of the transaction (e.g., LTV
ratio). The complete data dictionary is provided in the Appendix. The full dataset
includes 21.7 million FRMs with the combined principal value of $4.186 trillion
acquired by Fannie Mae between January 2000 and March 2014.
The mortgage performance dataset contains information about how the specific
loans performed over time after acquisition by Fannie Mae on a monthly basis.
The dataset contains over 917 million records pertaining to 21.7 million individual
mortgages. Each record in the mortgage performance dataset contains the Loan
Identifier field that is related to the Loan Identifiers specified in the mortgage
origination dataset. This correspondence allowed us to relate the mortgage
origination data to the mortgage performance data.
Industry practice shows that mortgage payers who fall behind by three months
nearly invariantly end up in default on the mortgage obligation (Sun, 2013). The
three-month period of delinquency is often referred to as ‘‘technical default’’ in
the banking industry (Quercia and Stegman, 1992). However, to avoid confusion
with the actual mortgage default that requires the transfer of legal rights to the
property and is often delayed in relation to the technical default (Allen, Peristiani,
and Tang, 2013), we refer to a three-month delinquency as a ‘‘severe delinquency.’’
To develop the dataset for our analysis, we combined the information containing
the predictor variables from the mortgage origination dataset with the subsequent
delinquency status of the individual mortgages from the mortgage performance
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E x h i b i t 1 u Severe Delinquency Rates in the Fannie Mae Portfolios in 2000:Q1–2014:Q1

dataset. We created a binary dependent variable, Severe Delinquency, which we
assigned the value of 1 if a loan became delinquent for three or more months and
0 otherwise.
Exploratory Analysis

In the first step of our analysis, we examined the historical delinquency rates for
mortgages acquired by Fannie Mae over the period from 2000:Q1 to 2014:1. In
Exhibit 1, we summarize the severe delinquency rates for the FRMs acquired by
Fannie Mae over this period of time. As can be seen, the delinquency rate rose
dramatically for mortgages acquired by the agency through the end of 2007. The
portfolio of mortgages acquired by Fannie Mae in 2007:Q4 had the highest default
rate over the history of the agency at 19.4%. The historical mortgage default rates
in the Fannie Mae portfolio averaged 1.7% (Peterson, 2009). The Fannie Mae
2007:Q4 prime mortgage portfolio includes 340,537 mortgages, with a total
principal value of more than $69.8 billion.
In the next step, we examined the historical variability of the key factors known
to affect mortgage defaults: borrower credit scores, LTV, and DTI (Demyanyk and
Van Hemert, 2011). The plot of the results for mortgages acquired by Fannie Mae
in 2000–2014 presented in Exhibit 2 does not reveal any drastic changes in the
average borrower characteristics (credit scores) or the loan characteristics (LTV
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E x h i b i t 2 u Average Borrower Credit Score, LTV, and DTI in the Fannie Mae Portfolios in
2000:Q1–2014:Q1

or DTI) over the period preceding 2007:Q4. There is a significant rise in the
average borrower credit score following the financial crisis, reflecting credit
tightening that occurred in its aftermath (Shenn, 2012), but no obvious
deterioration in the borrower credit scores, financial leverage (DTI) or increasing
amount of borrowing vis-a-vis the value of the properties (LTV) are evident in
the period prior to 2007:Q4.
The exploratory analysis did not produce any obvious insights into the potential
causes of the significant rise in the delinquency rates in the Fannie Mae portfolio
of mortgages in 2007–2008. This raises the question of whether there are
systematic patterns of delinquencies in the Fannie Mae portfolio that can shed
light on the underlying causes of delinquencies and help prevent similar events in
the future. To address this question, we performed data mining on the dataset of
mortgages acquired by Fannie Mae in 2007:Q4, seeking to build predictive models
able to capture patterns in the mortgage delinquencies that occurred. Our rationale
for choosing to focus on this dataset stems from the fact that this mortgage
portfolio had highest delinquency rate in the agency history at 19.4%, versus the
historical average of 1.7%. This dataset bears witness to the course of mortgage
delinquencies that followed the financial crisis. Analysis of this dataset may yield
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E x h i b i t 3 u Summary Statistics

Variable

Summary Statistics

Original interest rate

Mean 5 6.51%, Std. dev. 5 0.37%

Original balance

Mean 5 $205,327, Std. dev. 5 $100,687

Loan-to-value (LT V) ratio

Mean 5 73.73, Std. dev. 5 15.73%

Combined loan-to-value (CLT V) ratio

Mean 5 75.37, Std. dev. 5 16.07%

Number of borrowers

Mean 5 1.52, Std. dev. 5 0.52

Debt-to-income (DTI) ratio

Mean 5 39.30, Std. dev. 5 12.28

Borrower credit score

Mean 5 719, Std. dev. 5 61

Co-borrower credit score

Mean 5 727, Std. dev. 5 60

First time borrower

Yes 5 11.1%, No 5 88.8%, Unknown 5 0.1%

Loan purpose

Purchase 5 41%, Cash-out refinance 5 39.4%,
Refinance 5 19.6%

Property type

Single-family homes 5 73.4%, Planned unit
development 5 15.8%, Condo 5 9.5%, Multifamily homes 5 0.7%, Co-op 5 0.6%

Number of units

1 5 96.7%, 2 or more 5 3.3%

Occupancy

Principal 5 85.6%, Investment 5 9.6%, Second
home 5 4.8%

insights to the value of information variables available prior to mortgage
origination that can affect subsequent mortgage delinquencies.
Close inspection of the dataset revealed that the data provided by Fannie Mae is
generally of good quality with few aberrant records. We removed 530 records that
were missing the primary borrower credit score and 99 records that had $0 original
balance (these records were a subset of the records missing the credit score). After
cleaning, the dataset contains 340,007 records, with a combined principal value
at origination of $69.8 billion. Exhibit 3 below provides the summary statistics
for the individual variables in the data.
Prediction Models

Loan delinquency prediction is a binary classification problem. Prior research has
shown that different data mining algorithms perform better on different loan
datasets (Zurada, Kunene, and Guan, 2014). We evaluated six data mining
algorithms for their ability to predict loan delinquencies in our sample: logistic
regression, decision tree, random forest, boosted trees, support-vector machines,
and artificial neural networks. We briefly discuss each of the modeling techniques,
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as well as their merits and weaknesses. In the discussion of merits and weaknesses,
we specifically focus on the interpretability of individual models, because
mortgage delinquency prediction may expose the agencies to legal challenges
requiring the agencies to justify their decision to accept or reject a specific
mortgage. For this reason, an ideal model would provide full transparency into
the mortgage acceptance/rejection decision.
Logistic regression is a generalization of the linear regression models. This
modeling technique relates the predictor variables to the log of odds of an event,
and it estimates the parameters using the maximum likelihood approach for the
log of odds function:

Log(Odds) 5 b0 1 b1 xi 1 b2 x2 1 bi xi ,
where xi [i 5 1, 2, . . . , n] are variables that influence the odds of the outcome
of interest.
In a binary classification problem with a balanced sample, odds greater than 50%
would mean that the event will occur, and odds below 50% would mean that the
event would not occur. Logistic regression is a popular modeling technique
frequently used in practice (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2004), although the method
is not without limitations. For example, a linear relation is assumed between the
predictors and the log of odds of an event occurrence in a linear regression.
Logistic regression provides visibility into the significance of individual predictors
in the model and the sign (positive or negative) associated with each; however,
the specific correlation coefficients may be difficult to interpret. Further, the
logistic regression model is sensitive to missing values. Data imputation is
required to retain cases with missing values and this can lead to biased parameter
estimates, particularly where the missing values are non-random (Allison, 2000).
Decision trees is a classification algorithm that recursively separates observations
in branches to build a tree for the purpose of improving prediction accuracy
(Safavian and Landgrebe, 1991). For classification problems, the branching points
are based on the improvement in one of the commonly used information gain
metrics (Entropy or Gini index), which capture the improvement in homogeneity
of each subset of data after the split. The branching points identify the variables
and the corresponding thresholds that are used for the data split. The decision tree
models are transparent and easy to interpret; however, the decision tree algorithm
is greedy and therefore it may not capture the optimal global partitioning of the
data (Safavian and Landgrebe, 1991). While the decision tree algorithm is a
powerful modeling technique, it has a known weakness in potentially over-fitting
the training data (Bradford et al., 1998). A number of decision tree-based
modeling techniques have been developed that leverage the decision tree ability
to capture non-linear relations in the data and also safeguard against over-fitting.
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Random forest is an example of an ensemble modeling technique that combines
the predictions of multiple decision trees to achieve better overall performance
(Breiman, 2001). The random forest algorithm builds multiple tree models by
randomly selecting a subset of predictor variables and a subset of data to build
each tree. The algorithm sets aside an ‘‘out-of-bag’’ subsample of data, continually
evaluates the incremental improvement in the prediction accuracy with the addition
of each new tree, and it only retains the trees that to the overall model accuracy.
Boosted trees is another tree-based ensemble modeling technique (Bauer and
Kohavi, 1999). Similarly to the random forest models, the boosted trees algorithm
involves the construction of multiple tree models and aggregating the predictions
across the collection of models. The distinction of the boosted trees approach to
modeling is in improving the prediction accuracy by increasing the weights of
misclassified cases in each modeling round. By focusing on the misclassified
cases, the boosted trees algorithm can develop better overall results. By virtue of
being ensemble techniques, both the random forest and boosted trees models offer
limited visibility into how individual predictors affect the dependent variable, but
the models can be used to identify the relative importance of the individual
predictors to the overall model quality.
In addition to the models discussed above, which provide at least a degree of
transparency into the effects of individual factors, we also include two ‘‘black
box’’ modeling techniques in our analysis: support vector machine (SVM) and
artificial neural networks (ANN). The SVM modeling technique applies
mathematical (kernel) functions to transform the input feature space to identify a
boundary that can help separate the two classes of outcomes for a binary variable
(Amari and Wu, 1999). SVMs can utilize different kernel functions. Following
the evaluation of different kernels, we found that the Laplacian transform (Qi,
Tian, and Shi, 2012) produced the best results for the SVM family of models with
our dataset and this is the kernel function for which we report the SVM results.
The ANN is another modeling algorithm that we utilized. ANNs are an advanced
modeling technique that evolved from research aiming to model the function of
biological neural networks (Yegnanarayana, 2009). ANNs are typically comprised
of several layers of interconnected nodes. The input layer nodes correspond to the
individual predictor variables. The input nodes are connected to the inner layer
nodes, which can be programmed to perform different types of non-linear
transformations (e.g., a logistic function), and which, in a binary classification
problem, ultimately connect to a single output node. The parameters affecting the
individual connections between the nodes in the neural networks are ‘‘learned’’
through training by utilizing a back-propagation function, which captures the
errors on the output node and back-propagates the parameter adjustment
throughout the network to achieve better fit over the training rounds.
Model Performance Evaluation

The performance of the binary classification algorithms is commonly assessed by
splitting the data, using a part of the data (training set) to build the models and
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E x h i b i t 4 u Classification Matrix

Predicted
False

True

False

True negatives (TN)

False positives (FP)

True

False negatives (FN)

True positives (TP)

Actual

then assessing the model performance on the remaining data (test set) using the
classification matrix (Exhibit 4) and the derived metrics. In this study, we relied
on three model performance measures: true positive rate, positive predictive value
rate, and accuracy.

True positive rate 5 TP/(TP 1 FN)
Positive predictive value 5 TP/(TP 1 FP)
Accuracy 5 (TP 1 TN)/(TP 1 TN 1 FP 1 FN)
where TP denotes true positives, TN denotes true negatives, FP denotes false
positives, and FN denotes false negatives.
The true positive rate reflects the model’s ability to correctly identify severe
delinquencies that occurred vis-à-vis false negative errors, which indicate
mortgages that are predicted to not fall into delinquency, but did. A model with
the higher positive predictive value will make fewer false positive errors. The
positive predictive value reflects the model’s ability to correctly predict true
positives, which indicate mortgages that become delinquent, vis-à-vis false
positives. The false positive signal from a model would imply that a mortgage is
likely to become delinquent and such errors would likely lead to denial of credit
to misclassified borrowers.
It is important to note that the true positive rate of the individual models is a
critical measure of the model’s performance for predicting loan delinquencies. A
false negative, a mortgage delinquency that is not predicted accurately at
origination, exposes the underwriter to the potential loss of a part of the principal.
The average value of a loan in the 2007:Q4 portfolio was approximately $205,000.
Prior research on actual losses by mortgage underwriters in case of a default (loss
given default, LGD) suggests that the LGD can reach 50% on residential
mortgages (Park and Bang, 2014). Most of the severe delinquencies in our dataset
occurred within 18 months of the mortgage origination when less than 5% of the
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principal had been repaid. A conservative estimate of 25% LGD would imply that
every false negative would carry a cost of at least $50,000 without accounting for
the costs associated with the asset recovery. In recognition of the true positive rate
as the key metric for the evaluation of model performance, we optimized our
models for the maximum true positive rate, while setting the positive predictive
value threshold to 30%.
We followed the recommended practice of k-fold cross-validation (Breiman,
Friedman, Olshen, and Stone, 1984) for the evaluation of the individual algorithm
performance. The k-fold cross-validation consists of three steps:
1. Dividing the dataset into k disjoint subsets. Subsets are stratified for the
dependent variable to reduce model accuracy estimation bias (Kohavi,
1995).
2. Training the algorithm on k 5 1 subsets while withholding one of the
subsets for model performance evaluation. The process is repeated
withholding each of the subsets.
3. The cross-validation model performance results are averaged to produce
an estimate of the classifier accuracy.
Research suggests that 10-fold cross-validation is generally sufficient to establish
model performance estimate (Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, and Stone, 1984;
Kohavi, 1995).
We used R (64-bit, version 3.1.3) software to build and evaluate the data mining
models (Anon, 2015). R includes an implementation of the general linear models
(glm) in the default distribution. We used this implementation for the logistic
model in our analysis. We used the following packages to build the respective
models: rpart (decision tree), randomForest, ada (boosted trees), kernlab (SVM),
and nnet (neural networks).

u

Results

All models had difficulty with the accurate prediction of mortgage delinquencies.
The ANN neural network algorithm showed the best results, accurately predicting
83.4% of delinquencies on average. The random forest model performed the worst,
accurately predicting just 58.9% of the delinquencies. The results of 10-fold crossvalidation for each of the modeling techniques are given in Exhibit 5.
It is also important to note that while we optimized the models for the true positive
rate, we sacrificed the positive predictive value, a.k.a. the precision of the models.
The average precision of the ANN is only 36.7%. This means that roughly two
out of three predicted severe delinquencies will be false alarms. These (false
positive) errors would imply opportunity costs (missed opportunity to earn
interest) and they would also potentially affect availability and cost of credit to
the population of misclassified borrowers.
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True Positive Rate

Positive Predictive Value

Accuracy

Logistic regression

82.7% 5 0.8%

36.9% 5 2.4%

59.9% 5 0.6%

Decision tree

70.3% 5 2.7%

32.9% 5 2.9%

66.5% 5 0.7%

Random forest

58.9% 5 0.5%

30.9% 5 0.9%

66.5% 5 0.1%

Boosted trees

64.6% 5 1.5%

42.8% 5 2.0%

69.2% 5 0.7%

SVM

82.8% 5 3.2%

36.5% 5 2.6%

59.3% 5 0.5%

Neural network

83.4% 5 2.0%

36.7% 5 2.9%

59.4% 1 0.5%

E x h i b i t 6 u Feature Importance for the Model’s True Positive Rate

Neural Network
Feature

SVM
Score

Logistic Regression

Feature

Score

Feature

Score

Co-Borrower Credit Score

0.160

Credit Score

0.078

Co-Borrower Credit Score

0.106

Credit Score

0.117

Loan Purpose

0.034

Credit Score

0.073

DTI

0.063

DTI

0.029

CLT V

0.063

LT V

0.043

LT V

0.028

Mortgage Insurance

0.041

Original Balance

0.032

Seller

0.025

DTI

0.036

Seller

0.024

CLT V

0.025

LT V

0.027

Original IR

0.021

Num Borrowers

0.022

Original Balance

0.014

Mortgage Insurance

0.009

Channel

0.016

Original IR

0.012

Property Type

0.008

Original IR

0.016

Seller

0.005

CLT V

0.007

Original Balance

0.016

First Time Borrower

0.001

Although all the models performed poorly, it is still possible to gain insights on
the influence of individual predictor variables on the model accuracy. In the next
step, we examined the effects of individual variables on the accuracy of the models
using the feature permutation-based method (Altmann, Toloşi, Sander, and
Lengauer, 2010). This method relies on withholding individual predictors and
iteratively examining the effect of withholding the information on the model
positive predictive rate using the test data. The feature importance scores were
estimated over several trials. The scores did not change significantly over the trials
and the representative scores are provided because the focus is on the relative
feature importance as opposed to the specific scores associated with the individual
features. Exhibit 6 provides the results.
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The borrower and co-borrower credit scores, LTV, CLTV, and DTI are well known
predictors of mortgage defaults (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011). To further
explore the relation between these variables and subsequent delinquencies, we
binned the records and visualized the number of records corresponding to each
bin (the height of the bars in Exhibits 6–9) and the default propensity. Exhibits
10–12 reflect the data underlying the visualizations.
The visualizations reveal that the relations between the borrower credit score, LTV,
and DTI are not linear. For example, the LTV visualization reveals that the default
rate generally rises with the increasing LTV; however, the mortgages with LTVs
of 75%–80% actually had lower delinquency rates (16.88%) versus mortgages
with LTVs of 71%–75% (20.13%). The difference is significant at p , 0.001 (Z
score 5 13.996). The default rates rise dramatically for the mortgages with LTVs
above 80% (30.8%). This difference is also statistically significant (Z 5 42.2,
p , 0.001).
To identify the critical values of these factors in influencing mortgage
delinquencies in the Fannie Mae dataset, we constructed a decision tree model
focusing on these variables. The resultant decision tree is shown in Exhibit 13.
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The decision rules emergent from the CART decision tree algorithm reveal that
the credit score is the key information factor that is predictive of severe
delinquencies. While the overall dataset has a 19.4% severe delinquency rate,
FRMs issued to borrowers with credit scores greater or equal to 704 had only
11% severe delinquency, compared to 32% severe delinquency rate for borrowers
with credit scores below 704. The severe delinquency rate increases to 38% for
borrowers with credit scores below 666. The decision tree also reveals the layering
of risks. LTV reflects the borrowed amount in relation to the value of the property;
for borrowers with credit scores between 666 and 704, LTV is the key factor that
is correlated with severe delinquencies. Borrowers with credit scores between 666
and 704, who borrowed more than 84% of the value of the property, exhibited
the severe delinquency rate of 34%. For borrowers with credit scores below 666,
DTI becomes a significant predictor of mortgage delinquencies; 41% of borrowers
with credit scores below 666 and DTI greater than 34 ended up in severe
delinquency.
Exhibits 14 and 15 provide further evidence of risk layering between the individual
borrower credit score, individual level of indebtedness reflected in DTI and the
equity held in the property at origination (LTV).
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Discussion

In this study, we examined whether data mining techniques can capture systematic
patterns of mortgage defaults in the Fannie Mae FRM portfolio. We focused on
the mortgages acquired by the agency in the fourth quarter of 2007. We found
that the borrower credit score, LTV, and DTI were the most significant factors
correlated with the subsequent severe delinquencies. The list of factors identified
as significant predictors of mortgage delinquencies in our models suggests that
mortgage underwriters, including Fannie Mae, are collecting information that can
be useful in predicting future delinquencies. We found that certain threshold values
of credit scores, LTV, and DTI are associated with significantly higher delinquency
rates in the Fannie Mae portfolio from 2007:Q4. Borrower credit scores below
704 were a strong predictor of serious delinquency. About a third (32%) of
borrowers with credit scores below 704 were in technical default on their
mortgages in our dataset, compared with less than 11.5% of borrowers with credit
scores above 704. The size of the mortgage in relation to the property value (LTV)
was also a significant predictor, but the relation between LTV and severe

This content downloaded from 130.68.158.24 on Thu, 21 Jul 2022 15:35:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

W h a t

C a n

We

L e a r n

f r o m

P a s t

M i s t a k e s ?

u

2 5 1

E x h i b i t 10 u Number of Records and Delinquency Rate by Credit Score

Credit Score

Avg. Delinquency

# of Records

460

58.3%

24

480

56.8%

37

500

58.0%

143

520

57.9%

330

540

51.2%

772

560

42.8%

1,440

580

41.7%

6,467

600

40.1%

10,935

620

38.9%

19,167

640

34.9%

25,952

660

29.7%

30,853

680

24.3%

32,528

700

20.5%

33,985

720

16.9%

31,168

740

13.1%

34,759

760

8.9%

41,448

780

5.8%

44,034

800

3.8%

25,441

820

2.2%

502

840

0.0%

4

delinquency is not linear. Borrowers putting down payments of less than 16%
were much more likely to become severely delinquent on their obligations (29%
severe delinquency rate) than borrowers with 75 , LTV # 80, for whom the
severe delinquency rate was 16.9%. However, the delinquency rate was also higher
(20.1%) for borrowers with 70 , LTV # 75, indicating non-linear relations
between the predictors and the target. We also found evidence of layered risks.
Overleveraged borrowers with relatively low credit scores (,666), for whom the
combined monthly debt obligations exceeded 34% of their gross monthly incomes,
were also much more likely to fall behind on their mortgage payments (41%
severe delinquency rate). Spotty prior credit history, limited personal financial
investment in the property, and excessive borrowing against income make perfect
sense as predictors of mortgage delinquency. Following the financial crisis, Fannie
Mae announced tighter credit requirements for qualified mortgages (Reuters, 2008;
Shenn, 2012); the agency raised the minimum required credit score from 580 to
640 and raised the minimum required down payment to 20%.
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LT V
0

Delinquency Rate
0

Number of Records
9

5

16.0%

169

10

4.0%

428

15

4.9%

956

20

5.2%

1,741

25

5.1%

2,786

30

5.5%

3,815

35

6.7%

5,182

40

7.5%

6,931

45

10.0%

8,919

50

11.5%

11,975

55

13.9%

13,850

60

16.4%

17,987

65

18.8%

23,560

70

22.6%

31,756

75

20.1%

39,748

80

16.9%

95,214

85

30.8%

16,650

90

28.7%

35,520

95

28.3%

22,811

The surprising finding from our analysis was that it is very challenging to build
an accurate prediction model for mortgage delinquencies using the data from the
Fannie Mae portfolio. Model optimization for the true positive rate was only
possible at a significant cost to the precision of the model. Our best model, a
neural network, had an 83.4% average true positive rate; however, the average
precision of the model was only 36.7%. Operationalizing the model would carry
significant opportunity costs for the agency because it would likely lead to refusal
to underwrite a significant number of mortgages. The false positive errors would
also imply a societal cost as the rejected applications would likely preclude an
opportunity to own a home.
This brings up the next question: How can we improve the quality of the data
mining models to predict severe mortgage delinquency? One possible reason for
the challenges that we encountered in building the models could be information
insufficiency. We may be missing key information that could help us build better
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E x h i b i t 12 u Number of Records and Delinquency Rate by DTI

DTI

Delinquency Rate

Number of Records

5

12.5%

1,506

10

8.9%

4,977

15

8.9%

12,054

20

10.4%

22,501

25

12.1%

33,340

30

15.1%

42,256

35

18.7%

47,355

40

21.8%

48,611

45

24.2%

44,192

50

26.3%

33,464

55

25.5%

22,082

60

26.8%

17,017

models. Collection of additional information at the time of mortgage origination
would offer a possible solution. Prior research offers some support for this
proposal. Credit default analysis on a dataset from Israel, for example, identified
the level of education and the type of professional employment as the key
predictors of credit defaults (Feldman and Gross, 2005). Therefore, collection of
additional information at the time of mortgage origination, including the education
level and professional employment, may help improve the quality of the models.
An alternative and more likely explanation for the challenges that we encountered
in building an accurate prediction model using the Fannie Mae mortgage portfolio
dataset is that the financial crisis served as an exogenous cause of mortgage
defaults. In this scenario, the information that was available at the time of
mortgage origination simply would not be helpful in accurately predicting the
consequences of a crisis for the portfolio. The exogenous cause explanation would
imply that there was an external shock to the system that affected the base rate
of mortgage delinquencies, as well as the nature of the deterministic and
probabilistic relations among the data available at origination. Exogenous causes
are often mentioned in discussions of macroeconomic models (e.g., models of
unemployment) (Zivot and Andrews, 2002). The Great Depression and the oil
crisis of the 1980s are classic examples of exogenous events that caused
disruptions of linkages among macroeconomic factors and make it difficult to
build accurate econometric models spanning these periods of history. The recent
financial crisis had its origins in the rising defaults among the subprime borrowers
that quickly spread to the prime mortgage borrowers and were amplified through
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the broader economic downturn (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). This
exogenous shock reshaped the relations between the information used for borrower
risk evaluation at the mortgage underwriting stage and subsequent defaults.
The recent financial crisis had a number of causes. The issuance of 5/1, 3/1, and
2/1 adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and their securitization were among them
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). ARMs that carry a low introductory
interest rate, which resets after the initial 2-, 3-, or 5-year period, gained in
popularity in 2005–2006. Many of the ARMs were issued to subprime borrowers.
The problems of subprime lending were also exacerbated by so-called ‘‘liar’’ loans
(LaCour-Little and Yang, 2013) and corporate governance issues (Peni, Smith, and
Vähämaa, 2013). As the interest rates on these mortgages began to reset in 2007,
the mortgage payments for the borrowers grew drastically, triggering defaults
(Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund, 2009). Although ARMs constituted a relatively
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E x h i b i t 14 u Severe Delinquencies vs. Credit Score and LTV

small part of the overall mortgage market in 2007, the defaults on these mortgages
produced a domino effect (Sherlund, 2010). As the properties bought with ARMs
went into foreclosure they triggered rapid general declines in property values, as
well as a series of events that affected all sectors of the economy, including prime
mortgage borrowers. The economic downturn led to many people losing their jobs
and the loss of steady income triggered many delinquencies on the traditional
fixed-rate mortgages that were a part of the Fannie Mae portfolio.
The exogenous cause explanation for the failure of data mining techniques to
accurately capture the patterns of defaults in the dataset imply that economic
shocks will drastically increase mortgage default rates even among well-qualified
borrowers. We examined the default rates among the best-qualified borrowers,
those with credit scores above 760 for whom the historical delinquency rate across
different types of credit (consumer loans, credit cards, mortgages, etc.) is less than
2% (Fair Issac Corporation, 2015). We find that the delinquency rate for this group
was 5.5%–6.4% for the mortgages acquired by Fannie Mae in 2007. The 3X
increase in the severe delinquency rate among the best qualified borrowers
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provides supporting evidence for the role of the financial crisis as an exogenous
shock.
The current economic climate has largely pushed the concerns about the stability
of the housing market to the back of everyone’s mind and the GSEs have resumed
some of the practices that contributed to the financial crisis. For example, the
agencies now approve high LTV mortgages that require the borrowers to put just
3% down (Fannie Mae, 2015). The practical implication of the financial crisis
being an exogenous shock is that even if Fannie Mae restricted mortgage
purchases to the most qualified borrowers, the agency would have still faced
bankruptcy. In this scenario, a significant reduction in the financial leverage of the
agency would be necessary for the agency to weather the next financial crisis. The
recent financial crisis brought the Dodd-Frank reform to the banking sector,
effectively reducing financial average among the largest banks from 30:1 before
the crisis to less than 10:1 after the reform (Acharya, Engle, and Richardson,
2012). A similar reform would be required to safeguard GSEs from bankruptcy
going forward.

u

Conclusion

In this study, focusing on the data available prior to mortgage origination, we
examined the predictive value of several data mining techniques using the Fannie
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Mae mortgage dataset from the fourth quarter of 2007, which had the highest
delinquency rate in the agency’s history. Our data mining efforts revealed that the
borrower credit score, and loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios were the most
important predictors of mortgage delinquencies. The ANN was the best
performing model in our analysis. However, the ANN model identified the
majority of severe delinquencies that occurred only at the expense of a high rate
of false positives. The most likely reason for the predictive model shortcomings
is that the financial crisis served as an exogenous shock, the effects of which
cannot be accurately modeled using the data available at mortgage acquisition.
This result suggests that Fannie Mae’s current efforts to reduce future
delinquencies by tightening mortgage qualification requirements may prove
insufficient. Analysis of the Fannie Mae mortgage portfolio from 2007:Q4 shows
that 16.7% of mortgages issued to borrowers with credit scores above 640 were
severely delinquent in our dataset compared to the 1.7% historical delinquency
rate. These results provide empirical support for the calls to reform the housing
GSEs (Spahr and Sunderman, 2014).

u
uu

Appendix
Data Dictionary for the Fannie Mae Mortgage
Origination Dataset

Loan Identifier

Unique ID Assigned to Each Mortgage

Channel

The variable specifies the mortgage origination channel. The
mortgages were either originated directly by retail banks, through
a broker, or acquired from a different origination party after the
mortgage was issued.

Seller name

The entity that delivered the mortgage loan to Fannie Mae. For
legal reasons, we excluded this variable from our models.

Original interest rate

The original interest rate on a mortgage loan as identified in the
original mortgage loan documents.

Original unpaid principal
balance

The original amount of the mortgage loan as indicated by the
mortgage documents. This is the amount of money being
borrowed by the homebuyer to finance the purchase of the home.

Original loan term

The number of months in which regularly scheduled borrower
payments are due.

Origination date

The date of the loan.

First payment date

The date of the first scheduled mortgage loan payment to be
made by the borrower under the terms of the mortgage loan
documents. The first payment date is typically 30–45 days after
the mortgage origination date. This variable was not used in the
models as it closely mirrors the Origination date.
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Loan Identifier

Unique ID Assigned to Each Mortgage

Original loan-to-value (LT V)

A ratio calculated at the time of origination for a mortgage loan.
The original LT V reflects the loan-to-value ratio of the loan
amount secured by a mortgaged property on the origination date
of the underlying mortgage loan. A higher LT V reflects that the
homebuyer is borrowing a higher percentage of the property
value.

Original combined loan-tovalue (CLT V)

A ratio calculated at the time of origination for a mortgage loan.
The CLT V reflects the loan-to-value ratio inclusive of all loans
secured by a mortgaged property on the origination date. CLT V
accounts for any secondary mortgages that the property owner
may take out using the property as the collateral.

Number of borrowers

The number of individuals obligated to repay the mortgage loan.

Debt-to-income ratio

A ratio calculated at origination derived by dividing the
borrower’s total monthly obligations (including housing expense)
by his or her stable monthly income.

Borrower credit score

A numeric value used by financial services industry to evaluate
the quality of borrower credit. The score in the Fannie Mae
portfolio is based on the ‘‘classic’’ FICO score developed by Fair
Isaac Corporation.

First-time home buyer
indicator

The indicator denotes whether or not a borrower or co-borrower
qualifies as a first-time homebuyer. An individual is considered as
a first-time homebuyer if he / she 1) is purchasing the property;
2) will reside in the property; 3) had no ownership interest in a
residential property during three-year period preceding the date
of the purchase of the property.

Loan purpose

An indicator that denotes if a mortgage is used for either property
purchase, refinancing or refinancing with a cash-out option.

Property type

The field denotes whether the property is a cooperative share,
condominium, planned urban development, single-family home or
a manufactured home.

Number of units

The number of units comprising the related mortgaged property.

Occupancy status

The indicator denotes how the borrower used the mortgaged
property at the origination date of the mortgage (principal
residence, second home or investment property).

Property state

A two-letter abbreviation indicating the state within which the
property securing the mortgage loan is located.

ZIP (3-digit)

The code designated by the U.S. Postal Service where the subject
property is located.

Mortgage insurance
percentage

The percentage of mortgage insurance coverage obtained for an
insured conventional mortgage loan and used in the event of
default to calculate the insurance benefit.

Co-borrower credit score

A numerical value used by the financial services industry to
evaluate the quality of borrower credit. The score in the dataset
refers to the ‘‘classic’’ FICO score developed by Fair Isaac
Corporation.
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